A recent opinion by the US Supreme Court (“SCOTUS”), held that “when an alleged infringer uses a trademark as a designation of source for the infringer’s own goods, the Rogers test does not apply” and remanded the issue of trademark infringement back to the lower court, as well as the dilution claim given that the Ninth Circuit misread Section 1125 of the Lanham Act.[1]

美国最高法院（“SCOTUS”）最近的一项意见认为，“当被指控的侵权人使用商标作为侵权人自己商品的来源时，Rogers测试不适用”，并将商标侵权问题发回下级法院，以及鉴于第九巡回法院误读了《兰哈姆法案》第1125条而提出的淡化索赔。[1]

However, the Rogers[2] test, which was designed in the Second Circuit to protect First Amendment interests in the trademark context, was not abolished and SCOTUS took no position on it, nor in resolving the long-standing split between the Second and Ninth circuits that has, for years, given plaintiffs pause in determining a favorable venue.

然而，Rogers[2]测试是在第二巡回法院设计的，目的是在商标背景下保护第一修正案的利益，但它并没有被废除，SCOTUS对此也没有采取任何立场，也没有解决第二和第九巡回法院之间长期存在的分歧，多年来，这种分歧一直让原告在确定有利的管辖地时犹豫不决。

This case began with Jack Daniel’s Properties, Inc. (“Jack Daniel’s”) demanding that VIP Products LLC (“VIP”) stop selling its dog toy designed to look like a bottle of Jack Daniel’s whiskey, and marketed under the name, “Bad Spaniels.”

这起案件始于Jack Daniel’s Properties, Inc.（”Jack Daniel’s”)）要求VIP Products LLC（”VIP”）停止销售其设计得像一瓶Jack Daniel’s威士忌的狗玩具，并以“Bad Spaniels”的名称进行销售。

In response, VIP filed a declaratory judgment action asking the court to declare that the toy neither infringed nor diluted Jack Daniel’s trademarks. Jack Daniel’s counterclaimed for trademark infringement and dilution. VIP argued that the infringement claim failed under the Rogers test, and that the dilution claim “could not succeed because Bad Spaniels was a parody of Jack Daniel’s and therefore made “fair use” of its famous marks. §1125(c)(3)(A)(ii).”

作为回应，VIP提起了一项宣告性判决诉讼，要求法院宣布该玩具既没有侵权也没有淡化Jack Daniel’s的商标。Jack Daniel’s以商标侵权和淡化为由提出反诉。VIP辩称，在Rogers测试中，侵权索赔失败了，淡化索赔“不可能成功，因为Bad Spaniels是对Jack Daniel’s的模仿，因此‘合理利用’了其著名商标。§1125（c）（3）（A）（ii）。”  

Justice Kagan writes, “The District Court had rightly concluded that because VIP used the challenged marks as source identifiers, it could not benefit from the fair-use exclusion for parody. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 105a; supra, at 8–9, 17–18. The Ninth Circuit took no issue with that ruling. But it shielded VIP’s parodic uses anyway. In doing so, the court negated Congress’s judgment about when—and when not—parody is excluded from dilution liability.”

卡根法官写道：“地方法院正确地得出结论，因为VIP使用被质疑的标记作为来源标识符，它不能从戏仿的合理使用排除中受益。参见App. to Pet. for Cert. 105a；见上文，第8–9、17–18页。第九巡回法院对这一裁决没有异议。但无论如何，它否定了VIP的戏仿用途。在这样做的过程中，法院否定了国会关于何时可以——以及何时不可以——戏仿被排除在淡化责任之外的判决。”

In Justice Gorsuch’s concurring opinion, he cautioned, “I write separately only to underscore that lower courts should handle Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F. 2d 994 (CA2 1989), with care.” However, the concurring Justices even acknowledge their own confusion on the issue by stating, “it is not entirely clear where the Rogers test comes from—is it commanded by the First Amendment, or is it merely gloss on the Lanham Act, perhaps inspired by constitutional-avoidance doctrine?”

在大法官戈萨奇的赞同意见中，他提醒道，“我单独写信只是为了强调下级法院应该谨慎处理Rogers诉Grimaldi案，《联邦判例汇编》第2卷第875卷，994页（CA2 1989）。”然而，赞同意见的大法官甚至承认他们自己在这个问题上的困惑，“目前还不完全清楚Rogers测试是从哪里来的——它是由第一修正案命令的，还是仅仅是对《兰哈姆法案》的粉饰，也许是受到宪法回避原则的启发？” 

It goes without saying that this issue is not for the faint of heart, however, analysis into the case law that applies (or doesn’t apply) Rogers, while considering inter alia various circuits, specific facts of each case and what kinds of expressive works are at issue, can shed some guidance.

不用说，这个问题不适合胆小的人，然而，分析适用（或不适用）Rogers的判例法，同时考虑各种巡回审判、每个案件的具体事实以及有争议的表达作品类型，可以提供一些指导。

In most cases, the Second Circuit will first look to likelihood of confusion and if found, will determine whether it is of a sufficiently compelling level to outweigh First Amendment concerns identified by Rogers. The question of likelihood of confusion is generally separate from the Rogers test in the Ninth Circuit. The Supreme Court’s reasoning in the Jack Daniel’s case is consistent with the Ninth Circuit’s focus in its prior rulings on whether a defendant’s actions had caused any risk of confusion, rather than simply whether there was a likelihood of confusion not caused by anything other than mere use of the mark. Here, as the SCOTUS decision points out, VIP “conceded that it used the Bad Spaniels trademark and trade dress as source identifiers.”

在大多数情况下，第二巡回法院将首先考虑混淆的可能性，如果发现，将确定其是否具有足够的说服力，足以超过Rogers提出的第一修正案的担忧。混淆的可能性问题通常与第九巡回法庭的Rogers测试是分开的。最高法院在Jack Daniel’s案件中的推理与第九巡回法院先前裁决中的重点一致，即被告的行为是否造成了任何混淆的风险，而不仅仅是是否存在仅因使用商标而造成的混淆可能性。在这里，正如SCOTUS的裁决所指出的，VIP“承认它使用了Bad Spaniels商标和商业服装作为来源标识符。”

It appears, that the Ninth Circuit will continue to require affirmative statements or actions meant to explicitly mislead consumers to overcome Rogers’s second prong in cases involving marks used as elements of creative works where consumers do not expect them to designate source. But, in those limited situations where consumers do expect a mark in a creative work to be an indicator of source, the determination of whether the use is explicitly misleading will turn on whether the mark is used for a directly competing product as well as the extent to which the junior user added its own expressive content or simply adopted the senior user’s mark as the centerpiece of its work.

第九巡回法院似乎将继续要求旨在明确误导消费者的肯定性声明或行动，以克服Rogers的第二个问题，即在涉及被用作创意作品元素的商标的案件中，消费者不希望他们指定来源。但是，在这些有限的情况下，消费者确实希望创意作品中的标记能成为来源的标识，该使用是否具有明显误导性的判断将取决于该标识是否用于直接竞争的产品，以及初级用户添加自己的表达内容或只是将高级用户的标识作为其作品的核心的程度。

The next case that may continue to shape the Rogers landscape is Diece-Lisa Indus. Inc. v. Disney Store USA LLC, U.S., No. 22-347. It is unlikely that the Jack Daniel’s limited decision will have much bearing on the case, but it may continue to provide additional guidance on the balance between the First Amendment and the Lanham Act.

下一个可能继续塑造Rogers景观的案例是Diece-Lisa Indus. Inc.诉Disney Store USA LLC, U.S.，编号22-347。Jack Daniel’s的有限决定不太可能对此案产生重大影响，但它可能会继续为第一修正案和《兰哈姆法案》之间的平衡提供额外的指导。

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[1] As for dilution, the Court found that the Ninth Circuit had misread Section 1125 of the Lanham Act and its enumerated exclusions from dilution liability. Specifically, the Ninth Circuit erred in holding that the “noncommercial use” exclusion in Section 1125(c)(3)(C) applied to parodies or other humorous commentary. Instead, parodies fall within the “fair use” exclusion in Section 1125(c)(3)(A), but only if the mark is not being used “as a designation of source for the person’s own goods or services.” “In that event, no parody, criticism, or commentary will rescue the alleged dilutor.” The Court held that “the noncommercial exclusion does not shield parody or other commentary when its use of a mark is … source-identifying,” and, as with the infringement claim, remanded the dilution claim for further proceedings.

[1] 关于淡化，法院认定第九巡回法院误读了《兰哈姆法案》第1125条及其列举的淡化责任排除条款。具体而言，第九巡回法院错误地认为，第1125（c）（3）（c）条中的“非商业用途”排除适用于戏仿或其他幽默评论。相反，模仿属于第1125（c）（3）（A）条中的“合理使用”排除范围，但前提是该标识未被用作“个人商品或服务的来源”。“在这种情况下，任何模仿、批评或评论都无法挽救所谓的淡化者。法院认为，“非商业性排除不包括戏仿或其他评论，当其使用标识是……来源识别时”，与侵权索赔一样，将淡化索赔发回进一步审理。

[2] Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F. 2d 994 (2d Cir. 1989).

Case: Jack Daniel’s Properties, Inc. v. VIP Products LLC, No. 22-148 (U.S.)

Written by Douglas N. Masters

Managing Partner of Loeb & Loeb’s Chicago office and a partner in its intellectual property protection group

由Douglas N.Masters撰写

Loeb&Loeb芝加哥办事处的管理合伙人及其知识产权保护小组的合伙人